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appears to be the primary function of the heart, and ena-
bling vision appears to be the primary function of the eye. 
The concept of function has several interpretations (Wright 
1973), but at least some of these seem to imply an implicit 
goal-directedness. The heart is expected to pump blood, 
and it has properties that are well suited to that end. There 
is often also a valuative, normative aspect to functions, 
because a properly functioning heart seems good for an 
organism and a malfunctioning one seems bad. Both goal-
directedness and normativity are puzzling, because they do 
not occur in the non-living parts of nature. One may there-
fore wonder if and how they can arise in living organisms.
In this article, I will analyze biological functions from 
a naturalistic perspective. Thus, I assume that they can be 
understood as being produced by basic, physicochemical 
processes. I will show that functions can be autonomous 
causal factors, not depending on human understanding. 
This also applies to their goal-directedness and normativity. 
I will not perform a detailed conceptual analysis of the term 
“function”—neither an analysis of how it is typically used 
in natural languages, nor of how it is typically used by biol-
ogists studying functions. Approximate agreement between 
the concept of function developed here and typical usage is 
expected, but it is not a specific requirement or goal. The 
goal is to explain the ontology of functions, including their 
goal-directedness and normativity.
This article focuses on biological functions in non-
human species. The reason for this restriction is that the 
analysis of biological functions in humans is complicated 
by the dual role humans have. They are biological organ-
isms with functions of their own, but they are also the 
ones doing the interpretation of functions. Human social-
ity further complicates matters, because goals may become 
widely shared with others, which diffuses the benefits of 
a particular function. Although it is possible to extend the 
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Many of the parts and processes of biological organisms 
appear to have functions. For example, pumping blood 
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present approach to human functions, this is left to a future 
study. The same applies for an extension to the function of 
artifacts.
Are Functions Epistemological Constructs 
or Ontological Causal Factors?
It is clear that the material structures that perform a func-
tion, for example the heart and its muscles and valves, are 
ontological causal factors, or at least are fully composed of 
such factors. These material structures produce their effects 
in the standard way of any physicochemical process. How-
ever, it is less clear what causal status one should assign to 
the function as such, for example, the function of pumping 
blood. If the function as such has no causal efficacy beyond 
that of its material realization, then it should be regarded 
as an epistemological construct. It may be real (pumping 
blood is real), but the function ascription would not need to 
be included in a complete and sufficient causal inventory of 
the world. Including the material realization of the function 
would suffice for that. On the other hand, if a function as 
such has causal efficacy that goes beyond that of its mate-
rial realization, then it should be regarded as an ontological 
causal factor. A causal inventory of the world would not be 
complete without it.
This distinction between the ontology and epistemol-
ogy of functions is used extensively below. Functions that 
possess autonomous causal efficacy are denoted by the 
term ontic-causal. “Ontic” is meant here to denote that 
such functions exist independently of whether human intel-
lect (or equivalent) exists. “Causal” denotes that they are 
embedded in the causal dynamics of the world and that 
they form an autonomous and indispensable part of that 
dynamics. Functions that lack autonomous causal effi-
cacy are denoted by the term epistemic-real. “Epistemic” 
means here that the perception of humans (or other life 
forms) is required for noting the material structure associ-
ated with such functions. “Real” denotes that this structure 
is still objective. It is neither subjective, nor disputable, nor 
dependent on the attitude of observers.
A standard physicalist view assumes that all material 
processes are completely defined by the underlying, fun-
damental physical processes. In that view, biological func-
tions would be epistemic-real only, by definition. Moreo-
ver, their apparent goal-directedness and normativity would 
be epistemic-real as well. However, recent theoretical 
and computational work (van Hateren 2015a) has shown 
that goal-directedness is not necessarily epistemic-real. 
It can become ontic-causal through a subtle combination 
of deterministic and random processes, if this combina-
tion is subject to sustained evolution by natural selection. 
The structure of this theory is such that it can explain how 
ontic-causal functions can arise. In the next section, the 
theory is explained and applied to biological functions. 
Subsequently, other theories of biological function are 
discussed with respect to the question whether they pro-
duce epistemic-real or ontic-causal functions. It is argued 
that these theories produce epistemic-real functions only. 
Nevertheless, many of the key properties of these theories 
transfer to the new theory, which can thus be seen as a uni-
fying one. Finally, it is shown that the theory is consistent 
with an existing list of intuitions about functions (Wouters 
2005).
Explanation of the New Theory of Functions
The new theory of biological function is based on recent 
computational work (van Hateren 2015a). It conjectures 
that all living organisms contain an internal process X that 
approximates (i.e., estimates) the evolutionary fitness of the 
organism itself. This process subsequently modulates the 
variability of the organism in such a way that the actual fit-
ness is likely to increase, on average. Below, I explain the 
theory qualitatively. First, I explain how fitness is defined 
here; second, how X can be understood; third, how X is 
thought to affect the organism; and, finally, why X thus 
acts as an emergent ontic-causal factor that can produce the 
ontic-causal status of biological functions.
The concept of fitness that is used here is a form of indi-
vidual fitness (i.e., the fitness of an individual organism), 
not trait fitness (for a discussion of the difference see, e.g., 
Walsh 2015, Chap. 2). Moreover, fitness as used here is not 
the actual reproductive output of an organism. Instead, it is 
a propensity, that is, the organism’s capacity and tendency 
to survive and reproduce. Thus, it is not a post hoc measure 
of an organism’s actually realized success, but a concurrent 
measure of an organism’s likely success. The tendency to 
survive includes not only resilience against external threats, 
such as competitors and predators, but also the capacity 
for self-maintenance, such as through a well-functioning 
metabolism. The actually realized survival and reproduc-
tion relate to fitness only in a statistical sense, because they 
depend partly on random factors.
Fitness, as the capacity and tendency to survive and 
reproduce, is produced by a large range of factors that orig-
inate from the environment and from within the organism. 
For example, fitness is lower at times when food is scarce, 
because such scarcity decreases the organism’s chances of 
surviving and reproducing. Internal factors, such as mal-
functioning internal organs, have similar effects. But fit-
ness can recover when conditions improve. It becomes zero 
when the organism dies. In other words, fitness is a variable 
that changes continuously over time.
All factors that affect fitness can be conceived of as 
forming a highly complex fitness process, F. F is the 
114 J. H. van Hateren 
1 3
totality of influences and processes that actually produce 
fitness (which is denoted by f, the organism’s tendency to 
survive and reproduce). It is important to understand that 
both F and f are epistemic-real constructs. The process F 
is just a standard physicochemical process, and thus is 
causally effective only through the microscopic factors of 
which it is composed. Neither F nor f have autonomous 
causal efficacy, that is, causal efficacy that goes beyond 
that of their composing factors (including how they inter-
act). Another point that should be noted is that fitness as 
used here focuses on the organism, as the natural repro-
ductive unit. However, the approach is not committed to a 
particular level of selection. Fitness depends on the entire 
process F producing the organism’s tendency to survive 
and reproduce. F includes organismal factors and factors 
arising from the physical environment. But it also includes 
population-level feedbacks, such as the Malthusian factor. 
This factor reduces the fitness of all organisms in a popula-
tion when the population size approaches the environmen-
tal carrying capacity (e.g., when food or space becomes 
scarce). Frequency-dependent effects, such as those occur-
ring in mimicry, are automatically included in F as well. 
Factors at a level below that of the organism, such as devel-
opmental and genetic ones, are also included. The approach 
is therefore, intrinsically, a multilevel one with respect to 
natural selection (i.e., differential reproduction). It does not 
assume, a priori, that any level of selection is more impor-
tant than another one. This also applies to the mechanisms 
that can sustain traits across evolutionary time. Evolution 
by natural selection depends on the existence of such mech-
anisms. Although the most obvious mechanism is genetic, 
there are significant additional ones (e.g., epigenetics, the 
retention of cellular structures, niche construction, and 
social transmission).
The theory to be explained below conjectures that all liv-
ing organisms contain an internal process X, with an output 
value x that approximates (i.e., estimates) the evolutionary 
fitness f of the organism itself. It is important to understand 
that x is not a kind of fitness, but a fitness approximation. 
The term “approximation” is used here and below as simi-
lar to estimate, estimation, simulated result, and proxy. It 
implies that the value of x should at least roughly reflect 
the value of f, similarly to how the reading of a thermom-
eter should roughly reflect the actual temperature of the 
medium measured. But the quality of the approximation 
(estimation) could vary from poor to excellent. The pro-
cesses X and F are very different entities, in the same sense 
that a weather simulation (made through observation and 
computation) is qualitatively (i.e., categorically) differ-
ent from the weather itself. Both X and x are taken to be 
distributed throughout the organism, similarly to how that 
happens in a neural network. The physiological realiza-
tion of X depends on the species. In unicellular organisms, 
it is fully realized by intracellular processes, such as those 
involved in sensing, computing, and acting. In multicellular 
organisms without extended nervous systems (e.g., plants), 
the process also involves physiological mechanisms for 
intercellular communication and regulation. In organisms 
with brains, much of X is thought to be realized by sensory 
and neural processing.
The existence of X is a theoretical conjecture, not a con-
jecture based on direct empirical indications of its exist-
ence. It is a distributed process that produces its effects 
through modulation of randomness (as explained below). 
Therefore, to observe or infer it by chance or serendipity 
would be extraordinarily difficult. Causally effective ran-
dom variability is very hard to observe when it is embedded 
in deterministic causal processes, which are either domi-
nant or assumed to be dominant. The existence of X can, 
then, only be established by well-designed, targeted experi-
ments. But in order to do such experiments one already has 
to know what to look for. In other words, theory has to lead 
observation in this particular case.
Nevertheless, it is plausible that an X process can be 
present, given current knowledge of (neuro)physiology. 
Organisms routinely monitor many internal and external 
variables that affect their fitness. For example, a unicellular 
organism monitors the presence of nutrients surrounding it. 
Organisms contain physiological or neural circuits that can 
respond to adverse or beneficial conditions if these are indi-
cated by such monitoring. For example, an organism may 
respond by moving to a different place or by switching to 
a different kind of nutrient. Such responses are typically 
made in primarily deterministic ways, as part of conven-
tional cybernetic control circuits (not unlike the ones used 
in systems engineering and robotics). However, the circuits 
that detect adverse or beneficial conditions can play a dual 
role by also participating in the X process. The response 
produced by this process is not deterministic at all, but 
purely in the form of modulating random variability. Never-
theless, X does not need much additional circuitry for being 
present, because it can piggyback on existing molecular, 
cellular, and neural circuitry. Metaphorically speaking, it 
would be a fuzzy, stochastic process that is interwoven with 
the more easily observed deterministic processes.
The main effect of X, modulation of randomness, is a 
plausible mechanism as well. Physiology and neurophysiol-
ogy are based on molecular processes, which are intrinsi-
cally highly variable (mainly because of the thermal vari-
ability that is inevitable when the number of molecules is 
small). Such variability is detrimental for the working of 
many biological subsystems. Thus, a large range of mecha-
nisms exist that specifically reduce variability (e.g., DNA 
proofreading and repair, intracellular molecular amplifi-
cation, and averaging over time and space by sensory and 
neural processes; see, e.g., Faisal et al. 2008). Varying the 
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engagement of such variation-reducing mechanisms readily 
produces the type of modulation of variability required by 
the theory explained below. In other words, variability is 
typically controlled already, and modulating variability just 
requires controlling the control.
How X can affect an organism in illustrated in Fig.  1. 
The leftmost loop, R, symbolizes the basic process of 
evolution by natural selection. Organisms (abbreviated to 
“agents” here and below) reproduce, on average, in pro-
portion to their fitness, f. The basic R loop thus produces 
evolution by differential reproduction. Agents with higher 
f than others reproduce more, on average. Thereby, they 
tend to increase the contribution of their hereditary traits 
to future populations. This gradually changes the likelihood 
that specific traits occur in agents, or, equivalently, gradu-
ally changes the distribution of traits over a population of 
agents. As explained above, f is the result of a fitness pro-
cess F, which depends on factors  aF coming from within an 
agent A (e.g., related to its actual physiological state) and 
on factors  eF coming from outside an agent (summarized as 
A’s environment E). Factors  eF are related to actual physi-
cal and biological circumstances, such as the presence of 
food and mates.
In addition to this basic effect of fitness, fitness is con-
jectured to influence evolution through a secondary path 
(van Hateren 2015a). This is symbolized by the G loop in 
Fig. 1. As explained above, each agent is assumed to incor-
porate a process X of which the output x approximates f. 
X is also produced by many composing factors—aX com-
ing from within the agent and  eX coming from the envi-
ronment. However, the factors  aX and  eX are observed and 
processed by the agent, using sensors and implicit physi-
ological and neural computations. Thus, they are not iden-
tical to the actual corresponding factors  aF and  eF, but, at 
best, approximations of those factors. Again,  aX and  eX are 
as different from  aF and  eF as an observed temperature used 
in a weather simulation is—categorically—different from 
the actual physical temperature that participates in produc-
ing the weather. The factors  aX and  eX are included in X 
typically because previous selection has established them 
as probably being important for approximating f. For exam-
ple, a bacterium may sense the presence of glucose in its 
surroundings and may monitor its internal nutritional state. 
These factors are processed by X together with a large 
range of other factors, which results in an x that approxi-
mates f.
The resulting x is assumed to drive random variability in 
the structure of the agent, producing change at two different 
timescales. First, variability of heredity (through recom-
bination, mutation, and epigenetics) affects consecutive 
agents in a lineage. This produces change at the timescale 
of evolution (van Hateren 2015b). Second, variability of 
behavior and behavioral dispositions affects the agent, but 
usually not its lineage. This produces change at the time-
scale of an agent’s lifetime. The term “behavior” should 
be interpreted very broadly here. It includes development, 
learning, and phenotypic plasticity in its widest sense. It 
also includes internal physiological changes within unicel-
lular organisms and plants. Computational and mathemati-
cal analysis shows that the conjectured mechanism is evolv-
able if the variability is related to x in an inverse way (van 
Hateren 2015a, c). This is symbolized by the ~1/x in Fig. 1. 
The insets at the far right illustrate this point. When x is 
small (indicating a small fitness f), then 1/x is large (corre-
sponding to the peaks in the lower diagram) and the result-
ing variability is large as well (corresponding to a high 
noise level in the upper diagram).
Intuitively, the working of the mechanism can be under-
stood as follows. The explanation given below focuses on 
the timescale of an individual agent. Where appropriate, 
the case of an evolutionary timescale is added between 
parentheses, following “or,”. When x is large, the agent 
(or, its lineage) is probably doing well, and little variation 
is needed. But when x is small, the agent (or, its lineage) 
is probably not doing well, because low x indicates low 
fitness f. If nothing is changed, the agent may die (or, its 
lineage may become extinct). Part of the required change 
may be “known” to the agent if it is stored in physiological 
and neural circuits that were modified by previous learning. 
It may also be known to the agent (or, to the agents in a 
lineage) if it is stored in DNA that was modified by previ-
ous natural selection. Such known change can be executed 
automatically, as standard, mostly deterministic cybernetic 
control. It is not directly involved in the mechanism consid-
ered here.
However, in general, there is also unforeseeable 
change. Then neither the form of the change itself, nor 
0
time-varying
environment E
F(E,A)
agent A
variable
heredity
X(E,A)
G ~1/x
variable
behavior
R
eF
eF eF
aF
aF
eX
eX
aX
F: environmental &
physiological process
X: sensory &
physiological process
xf
Fig. 1  The new theory assumes an internalized approximation of fit-
ness, x (produced by a process X), of the actual fitness f (produced by 
a process F). See the main text for further explanation
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the consequences it might have for fitness, is known. Such 
unknown change should be large when x is small (which 
indicates low fitness), because that increases the probability 
that behavior (or, heredity) with better x can be found. This 
follows from the fact that the G loop is continually active 
within an agent (or, that a sequence of G loops is continu-
ally active in a lineage). Continual cycling through the G 
loop (or, the sequence of G loops) will sooner or later hap-
pen to produce a large x, unless the agent perishes before 
that happens. When a large x is encountered, subsequent 
variability is reduced, because of ~1/x. Then the behavior 
of the agent (or, the heredity of the agent at that specific 
point in the lineage) will remain close to forms producing 
this large x. After some time (or, across generations), envi-
ronmental change is likely to lower x. Then variability rises 
because ~1/x gets larger, and the search for high x starts 
all over again. Computations show that this mechanism is 
evolvable, at the behavioral timescale as well as at the evo-
lutionary one (van Hateren 2015a). Populations of agents 
containing the mechanism outcompete populations lacking 
it (i.e., populations that utilize a fixed, but optimized, vari-
ability that is not modulated by x). The mechanism works 
because the low probability of successful change is com-
pensated, on average, by the (probabilistic) prospect of fast, 
exponential growth in numbers. This growth follows when 
x (and thus f) is high enough. Even if many organisms will 
perish, the remaining ones can thrive and multiply.
The mechanism of the G loop is remarkable, because it 
utilizes randomness in a way that thoroughly mixes random 
and deterministic factors. In effect, it transfers determinacy 
by varying randomness. The outcome of a hereditary or 
behavioral trajectory that results from many G loop cycles 
is, therefore, unpredictable in detail. Yet, the long-term 
course of a trajectory is not completely random, because it 
is driven by x. At the behavioral timescale, such a combina-
tion of indeterminate and determinate factors is the signa-
ture of agency (van Hateren 2015a; agency is taken here as 
the ability to initiate behavior that is significant to the agent 
itself). In effect, the mechanism provides the agent with 
some behavioral freedom.
The agent (or, its lineage) appears to be driven into the 
direction of high x and thus, quite probably, high f as well. 
But this happens without explicit, foreseen directionality. 
The directionality is purely the statistical consequence of 
a random, probabilistic process. The G loop lets the behav-
ior of the agent (or, the heredity of the agents in a lineage) 
drift away quickly from structures with low x, because low 
x produces large behavioral (or, hereditary) variability. In 
effect, the agent’s behavior (or, its heredity) accumulates at 
structures with high x, where variability, and thus drift, is 
low.
X is part of the agent and it originates within the agent 
through random modifications. Modifications of X affect 
fitness, through which they are, implicitly, evaluated. 
Importantly, the ultimate causal efficacy of X depends on 
the condition that x approximates fitness. This approximat-
ing relationship between x and f (i.e., the fact that x is an 
estimate of f) is in fact an emergent factor with autono-
mous causal efficacy. It has causal efficacy in addition to 
the direct (proximate) causal efficacy of the material parts 
of X. In particular, the model implies that the material 
parts of X can only affect fitness if the non-material rela-
tion between x and f is present as well. The latter is partly 
independent of X, because the relation not only depends on 
x, but also on F and f (which can vary autonomously and, 
to some extent, randomly). Therefore, both causal aspects 
of X are needed in conjunction, and they can be regarded as 
complementary. They produce neither epiphenomenalism, 
nor causal overdetermination.
The autonomous causal efficacy of the relation between 
x and f gives an ontic-causal status to x. Its relation with 
f needs to be included in a complete and minimal causal 
inventory of the world. As stated above, f itself is an epis-
temic-real construct that is fully defined by its microscopic 
constituents and their interactions. Readers may be puz-
zled by the fact that x obtains ontic-causal status by being 
related to an epistemic-real f. However, one should realize 
that the relation between x and f is not based on a regular 
physicochemical connection. Rather, it is an approximat-
ing relationship that cannot be defined in terms of physico-
chemical constituents. Properties of f do not transfer to x, 
just like the properties of the weather (e.g., that it is wet, 
hot, cold, or windy) do not physically transfer to a weather 
simulation. The weather and its simulation belong to differ-
ent categories.
The approximating relationship between x and f is an 
emergent, nonmaterial factor with causal efficacy. The 
drive towards high x must be regarded, then, as the implicit 
goal of the agent (van Hateren 2015a). The agent combines 
this goal-directedness with the behavioral freedom pro-
vided by agency. Agency makes it possible that the agent 
changes its behavior in a direction away from the goal 
(i.e., towards lower x), even though changing in a direc-
tion towards the goal remains more likely. The strength of 
attraction towards the goal must be equated, then, to the 
value that the agent implicitly attaches to the goal. The goal 
of high x is implicitly normative, for the agent itself (van 
Hateren 2015d). The agent is expected to strive for high x, 
intrinsically. It is supposed to strive for high x not from the 
point of view of any external agent, but from the point of 
view of the agent itself. Thus, the G loop produces primor-
dial forms of agency, goal-directedness, and normativity, as 
emergent factors. Moreover, it also produces a primordial 
form of causally effective reference, because X is causally 
effective only because x implicitly refers to f (in the form 
of an approximating relationship). Whereas reference plays 
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no causal role in abiotic nature, it is present in systems if 
(and probably only if) these contain an X process. Because 
X presupposes evolution, such systems must be living 
organisms.
As argued above, high x must be regarded as the overall 
goal of an agent. But in practice, the process X is decom-
posed into subprocesses that serve specific subgoals, such 
as having a well-functioning heart, finding food, and find-
ing mates. Together, these subprocesses and subgoals 
contribute to X and x. The intrinsic goals of the agent are 
completely defined by X. New goals are, by definition, 
incorporated into an accordingly changed X. Because X 
has a nonmaterial causal aspect (in the form of the relation 
between x and f), its subprocesses also have a nonmate-
rial causal aspect (in the form of the relation between their 
subgoals and the corresponding parts of F). Subprocesses 
that monitor specific functions then produce a causal effi-
cacy that goes beyond that of the material realization of the 
functions themselves.
Similarly, the way in which X modulates variability (as 
based on x) is also decomposed into subprocesses affecting 
different parts of the agent differentially. If x is low because 
a specific trait is malfunctioning, variability need not (and 
will not in general) be redirected to that specific trait. How 
variability is redirected and distributed in specific organ-
isms is likely to be quite complex, depending on the par-
ticulars of the organism and its habitat. However, the way in 
which X distributes variability is readily evolvable through 
standard evolutionary mechanisms, because it affects f. It is 
therefore likely to be adequate, on average. As an example 
of how variability may be redirected, we can consider the 
function of hemoglobin in vertebrates. It has the function 
of enhancing oxygen transport, according to existing the-
ories of biological function. The new theory ascribes this 
function to hemoglobin as well, as follows. If hemoglobin 
starts to work less effectively, such as in the presence of 
interfering chemicals, then this is detected by control cir-
cuits regulating the oxygen levels in an organism. Compen-
satory changes (e.g., to respiration) are then made through 
standard feedback control, primarily in a deterministic way. 
The new theory conjectures that a deficient oxygen level 
produces, in addition, effects through X. This is done in 
a stochastic way and is based on approximating (estimat-
ing) the organism’s overall fitness. The oxygen level is 
one of the factors likely to be used for producing such an 
overall fitness estimate, because this level is highly signifi-
cant for the actual fitness. Therefore, X has likely evolved 
to include it, because that improves the adequacy of x as 
an estimator of fitness. Therefore, a poor performance of 
hemoglobin reduces x, and thus, indirectly, drives more 
variability anywhere in the organism. For example, it may 
result in behavioral variations that eventually result in the 
organism finding a less energetic lifestyle. Such a lifestyle 
can enable it to survive, despite suboptimal oxygen levels. 
The new lifestyle can become fixed (through a reduction of 
behavioral variability), because X subsequently indicates 
that the expected (i.e., approximated) fitness has become 
fairly high again.
In conclusion, biological functions can acquire ontic-
causal status as follows. If a trait, process, or behavior is 
of evolutionary significance to an agent, for example the 
pumping of blood by the heart, then it is likely to be repre-
sented in X. This is likely, because X would need to moni-
tor the blood circulation in order to produce an x that is a 
reasonable approximation of f. A poorly working blood cir-
culation should be reflected in a decreased x. A reasonable 
approximation of f by x is required for obtaining high fit-
ness (through the mechanism of the G loop). It is therefore 
under positive selection pressure. We have seen above that 
subprocesses of X have autonomous causal efficacy, that is, 
they are ontic-causal. Therefore, the function as such is also 
ontic-causal. It has a non-material causal aspect (through 
X) that occurs in addition to the material realization of 
the function itself (such as is realized by the heart and its 
muscles).
In order to decide whether a trait or process is functional 
in the ontic-causal sense, one needs to determine whether 
it is represented in X, that is, whether it is monitored by X 
(and thus used for producing x and for modulating organis-
mal variability). Whether a trait or process is monitored by 
X is ultimately an empirical question. X is just a physiolog-
ical or neural process that can be identified and modeled, 
including if and how it tracks the performance of specific 
traits or processes. If X exists (as conjectured here), it must 
be included in any adequate model of the organism. When 
a good model of X is established, then this also establishes 
what is represented in X and what not.
Until such empirical and modeling studies are available, 
common sense arguments may be used to evaluate the pro-
posal made in this article (see, e.g., the section “Intuitions 
About Functions”). The key notion here is that X itself has 
evolved and is subject to continuing evolutionary pressure. 
If x approximates f well, it gives the organism an evolution-
ary advantage. But like any biological process, X is costly 
(e.g., in terms of energy and material use), thus it will typi-
cally acquire parts that are useful and, eventually, lose parts 
that have become useless. Moreover, useless parts may even 
reduce how well x approximates f. Such a reduction would 
decrease the organism’s evolutionary advantage, because it 
would decrease how well the G loop works. Useless parts 
in X would, then, be specifically selected against. Thus, one 
can use the usual evolutionary reasoning to make plausible 
arguments as to what is included in X and what not.
A provisional definition that may be useful for such 
commonsense arguments is that “the working of a biologi-
cal trait or process has an ontic-causal function if and only 
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if its performance is monitored by X—where how X imple-
ments the sign of the trait’s contribution to x determines 
how one should formulate the function.” It is important to 
note that monitoring as such is neutral with respect to the 
question whether the effects of a trait or process in specific 
cases contribute positively or negatively to x. The mere 
fact of being included in X is already sufficient for hav-
ing an ontic-causal function. Therefore, a malfunctioning 
heart still has the function of pumping blood, because its 
performance continues to be monitored by the X process. 
Nevertheless, the implemented sign of the contribution to 
x is important for how one should, linguistically, formulate 
the function. Saying that the function of the heart is “to 
pump blood” is correct, because “pumping blood” is imple-
mented in X in such a way that it contributes positively to 
x (and thus is an implicit goal). One might perhaps inter-
pret “monitoring pumping blood” alternatively as “moni-
toring not pumping blood.” But saying that the function 
of the heart is “not to pump blood” is incorrect, because 
“not pumping blood” contributes negatively to x (and thus 
is not a goal, but something to be avoided). The definition 
explicitly includes “ontic-causal,” because one is free, of 
course, to define biological functions more broadly, i.e., in 
an epistemic-real sense. A broadly defined concept of func-
tion may be convenient when used metaphorically in cer-
tain scientific explanations, even if it assigns functions to 
processes that have no autonomous ontic-causal status.
Ideally, functional goals represented in X would always 
serve f, because x is under selection pressure to approxi-
mate f as well as possible. However, this is not guaranteed, 
and agents may therefore have goals that are not in their 
best interest. Such goals can only be transient, because they 
are selected against or found to be disadvantageous through 
learning, eventually. Therefore, x tends to be well aligned 
with f.
Other Theories of Functions
Broadly speaking, there are two main traditions for explain-
ing biological functions. The causal role (CR) school 
(Cummins 1975, 2002) characterizes functions by their 
current causal role in accomplishing assumed capacities of 
a containing system. In biological organisms, such capaci-
ties may take the form of specific goals, e.g., survival and 
reproduction (Boorse 1976). In contrast, the selected effects 
(SE) school (Millikan 1984, 1989; Neander 1991) looks at 
the historical, evolutionary causes of biological functions. 
Although some approaches incorporate elements of both 
schools (e.g., Walsh and Ariew 1996; Buller 1998) and 
there are alternative approaches, I use a clean dichotomy 
here for explanatory purposes. This clearly exposes the 
problems that arise if one seeks to assign ontic-causal sta-
tus to biological functions.
Selected Effects Functions
The upper diagram in the left part of Fig. 2 illustrates the 
basic idea of the SE explanation. This explanation is also 
known as etiological, that is, with the explanation provided 
by a chain of historical causes. A particular agent has func-
tions that are active, or at least potentially active, in the 
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present or future (black dots and arrows). The SE approach 
assumes that these functions can be explained by their ori-
gin, through natural selection, in the evolutionary past of an 
agent (Millikan 1984, 1989; Neander 1991). Alternatively, 
such selection can be formulated in terms of fitness (Grif-
fiths 1993; Buller 1998), by requiring that functions have 
contributed positively to the fitness of the agent’s ancestors. 
In the figure, this is symbolized by the historical fitness 
f. Either way, natural selection and the effects of fitness 
occurred in a distributed way over time, which is symbol-
ized by the gray area.
As stated above, we seek to assign ontic-causal status to 
functions. Functions exist in the present. If they are ontic-
causal partly because of a historical process (historical fit-
ness), then the question arises how this historical process 
is connected to the current entity. Some causal connection 
must be present if functions are to be ontic-causal. Without 
such a connection, the functions could only be epistemic-
real. The main possibilities I can think of that might pro-
duce such a causal connection are depicted schematically 
in Fig. 2a–d.
The first possibility (Fig.  2a) assumes that there is a 
causal connection through immaterial (e.g., Platonic) 
means (dotted arrow). For example, one may assume that 
a historical process consists of objective facts, that it exists 
in its own right, and that it extends its existence across time 
(similar to a Platonic circle, which could be seen as time-
less). It can then connect to the present function. However, 
such an immaterial explanation has no clear naturalistic 
interpretation. It seems too implausible to be considered 
further here.
The second possibility of a causal connection (Fig. 2b) 
is the standard way by which causal influences are thought 
to be connected to one another in physicochemical pro-
cesses. Such processes are fully defined by an instanta-
neous state, at each moment in time, that proceeds to the 
next state, at the next moment in time. Importantly, such 
processes do not contain explicit information about earlier 
states. This lack of historical information implies that the 
mechanism of Fig. 2b cannot directly connect the relevant 
parts of the fitness history to the present. At most, it only 
transfers information about the state immediately preced-
ing the present one. Everything before is “forgotten” and 
irrelevant from a physicochemical point of view, because 
physicochemical states unfold locally in time. There is no 
way to tell, purely from the state, how the system got to that 
state. Its history can only be reconstructed by using spe-
cific background information. But that would be epistemic 
inference. Relying on it would only produce functions with 
epistemic-real status.
A variant of the causal connection of Fig. 2b was pro-
posed by Millikan (1984). Lines of descending organisms 
are connected by an uninterrupted chain of reproduction. 
Reproduction thus transfers the effects of natural selection 
(or of fitness) across time. However, reproduction has no 
special status from a naturalistic point of view. It is just a 
physicochemical process that is completely defined by pro-
cesses unfolding locally in time. In other words, nothing is 
transferred beyond the immediate physicochemical state.
One might think that developmental processes in an 
organism can solve the problem of causally connecting the 
present function to the evolutionary past, because they con-
struct a trait as homologous to ancestral traits. However, 
such an explanation depends on epistemic interpretation. 
It requires human perception to note the structural corre-
lation that is associated with “homologous.” Such a corre-
lation has no autonomous causal efficacy. It can be a fac-
tor in scientific explanations, but it does not belong to the 
fundamental causal inventory of the world. Thus, functions 
explained in this way are only epistemic-real.
Similarly, nothing is solved if one would invoke DNA 
as a carrier of historical information. Biological function-
ality is used already when one interprets DNA as a form 
of memory. Memory presupposes biological functionality, 
because it assumes that it is possible to refer across time. 
Conventional physicochemical processes cannot refer 
across time or space, because all interactions are strictly 
local in time and space. In contrast, the theory explained 
above can produce nonlocal causation because of the non-
local reference that x makes to f. However, this already 
requires agents that are subject to evolutionary pressure and 
that possess an X system (this is formalized mathematically 
in van Hateren 2015c). Fundamentally, nonliving physico-
chemical processes lack memory (the memory in machines 
is a macroscopic phenomenon that presupposes human 
interpretation; at the microscopic level, machines do not 
utilize memory). Using memory for explaining the ontic-
causal status of biological functions would be circular, 
unless one first explains nonlocal reference across time (by 
introducing X).
The scope of memory is evolutionary in the case of 
DNA, but the problem remains for faster forms of mem-
ory. For example, Garson (2012) proposes a generalized 
selected effects theory for functions in neural systems, uti-
lizing selective (but non-evolutionary) processes acting on 
synapses, neurons, or neural groups (e.g., through develop-
ment and learning). However, selected neural functions are 
formed at an earlier moment than when they are typically 
used. In other words, the causation would depend on mem-
ory, and would be epistemic-real again. Therefore, it would 
fail to give ontic-causal status to functions.
The current argument is similar to the intuition inherent 
in well-known counterexamples against SE theory. Such 
counterexamples involve organisms that are identical to 
actual ones but with a completely different history, such 
as hypothetical instant organisms (e.g., Swampman) that 
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are produced spontaneously (Boorse 1976, p.  74; Nean-
der 1996; McLaughlin 2001, pp.  108–113). If functions 
have an ontic-causal status and naturalism is true, identi-
cal organisms must have identical functions. But according 
to basic SE theory, different histories would imply differ-
ent functions. Therefore, basic SE theory must be amended 
if one seeks to assign ontic-causal status to functions (see 
below).
The third possibility of causally connecting history with 
present functions is sketched in Fig. 2c. It involves human 
intellect interpreting the fitness history of a specific agent 
and assigning functions to the appropriate processes. The 
historical information that was lacking in Fig.  2b is now 
implicitly present in human intellect and memory. Human 
intellect thus connects historical fitness to the present 
agent. However, intellect already presupposes biological 
functionality, because it depends on memory, agency, goal-
directedness, and nonlocal reference in general. The pos-
sibility of Fig. 2c is perfectly legitimate and is standardly 
used for scientific inference. But it only produces functions 
that are epistemic-real. The function ascription is objec-
tive and real for the human (in the sense of the real patterns 
of Dennett 1991), but it does not produce an ontic-causal 
function in the agent.
The final possibility of producing a causal connection 
between fitness history and functions (Fig.  2d) assumes a 
special process in the agent, X. As explained above, this 
can indeed produce ontic-causal functions. Information on 
the fitness history is implicitly stored in the structure of X. 
Part of the theory can be seen as an amended version of SE 
theory, where x, rather than f, is utilized (see below).
Causal Role Functions
The right half of Fig.  2 illustrates several variants of the 
CR explanation. This theory focuses on the present and 
investigates the causal role that functions have for the cur-
rent capacities of an agent. Such capacities are typically 
relative to the agent’s internal state and to its environment, 
including other agents. Clearly important to an agent are 
the capacities to survive, to maintain homeostasis, and to 
obtain a high fitness f. However, these are compound fac-
tors, which do not have causal efficacy beyond that of their 
constituent factors. For example, the fitness of a bacterium 
is produced by a multitude of physical factors (temperature, 
presence of nutrients, absence of antibiotics, and so on). 
Only these factors directly influence the bacterium and its 
chances of survival and reproduction. In contrast, fitness 
itself is an epistemic-real factor. Fitness is objective and 
real, and plays an important role in human scientific theo-
ries. But it has no autonomous causal efficacy beyond that 
of its constituents and their interactions, and it cannot make 
functions ontic-causal. Therefore, functions acquire mere 
epistemic-real status if they are explained by their role for 
survival, fitness, and homeostasis. Human intellect is then 
required (Fig. 2e).
Capacities (Cummins 1975) or goals (Boorse 1976) 
are explicitly assigned during human analysis of a sys-
tem (Fig.  2f). They depend on the causal organization of 
the system. However, “organization” is an epistemic-real 
phenomenon, not an ontic-causal one. Inferring organiza-
tion is part of human functionality. Organization in abiotic 
systems never has causal efficacy of its own, even if such 
systems are complex. For example, there appears to be 
structure and organization, in the form of nonlocal correla-
tions, in the atmospheric system that produces weather and 
climate. Scientific theories about the atmosphere depend on 
specifying this structure. They may use complex explana-
tory factors in the form of correlated aggregates, such as 
clouds, tornadoes, seasons, and ice ages. But such struc-
ture has arisen gradually and naturally from the history 
of system states, without structure itself participating in 
the causal dynamics. The actual causation is purely local, 
through local pressure, local radiation, local mass trans-
port, and so on. Only those local factors are needed in the 
fundamental causal inventory of the world.
According to the standard naturalistic view of living 
organisms (i.e., without conjecturing an X process), they 
are also just physicochemical systems, albeit highly com-
plex ones. They may be more complex than most abiotic 
systems, but they are still fully driven by the standard local 
causation of any physical and chemical process. Neverthe-
less, living organisms appear special, because they have 
a cyclically closed organization. This forms the basis of 
organizational accounts of function (Mossio et  al. 2009; 
Moreno and Mossio 2015). In a closed organization, the 
system specifically produces products and conditions that 
are required for sustaining the working of the system itself. 
This also happens in some simple abiotic systems, such as 
a candle flame (which sustains itself by drawing in its own 
fuel and oxygen). But living organisms do this in ways that 
are far more differentiated and complex. However, one can 
still completely define the dynamics of a complex cyclical 
system in terms of the local processes and local interac-
tions of which the system is composed. Its complexity does 
not make it fundamentally different from the atmospheric 
system. One could specify all molecular components and 
interactions of a metabolic system in a similar way as those 
of the atmosphere, and readily simulate either system. In 
other words, “organization” need not be included in a fun-
damental causal inventory of the world. It has no autono-
mous causal efficacy, neither in a candle flame, nor in a 
standard (X-lacking) living organism. It cannot give ontic-
causal status to biological functions.
In contrast, living organisms that contain an X process 
do have an additional causal factor that goes beyond the 
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standard causation of abiotic systems. The presence of X in 
a G loop introduces a relation as a causal factor, namely the 
approximating relationship between x and f. This relation 
cannot be reduced to local processes and local interactions. 
Moreover, X and x integrate processes across the organism, 
both by affecting and by being affected. This provides the 
organism with a form of unity that is lacking in abiotic pro-
cesses. In abiotic processes, one can always eliminate struc-
ture as a causal factor, as in the weather and climate exam-
ple given above. But this eliminative strategy does not work 
in the case of living organisms that contain an X process. 
Elimination would leave no room for the relation between 
x and f. It would thereby neglect an essential, ontic-causal 
part of how living organisms work. Living organisms are, 
therefore, intrinsically distinct, non-epiphenomenal enti-
ties, in contrast to, e.g., a tornado. X is evolvable, and could 
gradually emerge from systems lacking X. Therefore, the 
theory does not assume a property (distinctness) in order 
to explain that property. The explanation involves gradual 
change through time, which makes the explanation cycli-
cal rather than circular. It is therefore perfectly legitimate. 
Finally, it should be recognized that both organismal unity 
and causally efficacious relations are key notions of the 
organizational theory of functions (see, e.g., Moreno and 
Mossio 2015, Chap. 2). The current theory may be viewed 
as providing a naturalistic grounding of such notions.
One way to detect what functions are typically doing is 
to observe the distribution of their properties in a popula-
tion (Fig. 2g). This yields an estimate of statistical normal-
ity (Boorse 1977). The distribution of properties in a popu-
lation approximately reflects the evolutionary history of the 
function, in that it is likely to be concentrated at properties 
that contribute positively to fitness. Therefore, current sta-
tistical normality can be regarded as the population version 
of the historical SE approach. However, distributions of 
properties have no autonomous causal efficacy and cannot 
directly influence organisms. Such distributions are epis-
temic-real entities, not ontic-causal ones. This approach, 
therefore, produces epistemic-real functions, depending 
on human intellect (Fig.  2g). The recent modal theory of 
Nanay (2010) also requires human intellect, because it 
depends on inferring the effect of functions in “relatively 
close” possible worlds. Possible worlds are entities that 
cannot exert direct causal influence, and thus can only be 
used for explaining functions as epistemic-real.
As before, the only way to avoid human intellect is 
through an internal process X within the agent (Fig. 2h). X 
refers, implicitly, to the relevant factors in environment and 
agent. Functions become ontic-causal because of the causal 
efficacy of the relation between x and f.
Unification of Theories of Biological Function
As argued above, the ontic-causal efficacy of functions 
derives from the fact that x approximates f. X is itself an 
evolved physiological or neural process. Therefore, the his-
tory of f has shaped the way in which X lets x approximate 
f. Thus, the structure of X depends on that history. It is, 
therefore, closely associated with the selected effects the-
ory of functions. When X is used for explaining functions, 
the history of f is used as well, albeit only implicitly and 
indirectly (Fig. 2d). The implicit memory of X that appears 
to be present here does not presuppose biological function-
ality (in contrast to when one would directly invoke devel-
opmental or genetic memory). It has emerged naturally 
from the evolved property of X that x approximates f (and 
that parts of X approximate corresponding parts of F).
In addition to the part of X that focuses on heredity and 
fitness history, there is also a behavioral component in X 
(Fig.  3). This component modifies the organism during 
its lifetime, through phenotypic plasticity and similar pro-
cesses. Again, these modifications depend on the require-
ment that x approximate f. There is no certain way for 
the organism to verify, on the spot, the correctness of this 
approximation. But effective mechanisms to that end must 
have evolved over evolutionary time. For example, learning 
strategies must have evolved that are likely to produce ade-
quate approximations, on average. The behavioral part of X 
has no direct selected effects explanation (unless the con-
cept of selection is stretched, as in Garson 2012). It is par-
ticularly associated with the causal role theories of function 
(Fig. 2h), because it specifically attempts to track real-time 
changes in F and f. The behavioral part of X is continually 
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adjusted during the lifetime of an organism. Capacities and 
goals can thus become part of X.
X is causally effective because of two different causal 
aspects that are both necessary, as was explained above: 
first, a nonconventional causal aspect in the form of an 
approximating relationship between x and f; second, a 
conventional material causal aspect in the form of the 
physicochemical realization of X. The latter is a conven-
tional process that monitors the condition of the organism 
and affects its variability. Functions are fully defined by 
how X monitors. In other words, functions do not depend 
on the etiology of X, but only on the current structure of 
X. Organisms that arise spontaneously (e.g., Swampman) 
have exactly the same X as identical evolved organisms, 
and they have therefore exactly the same functions. Neither 
does the causal efficacy of X depend on its etiology. Given 
identical organisms in identical circumstances (now and in 
the future), F and f will be identical, as well as the rela-
tion between x and f. X will then have the same effects on 
Swampman as on its natural counterpart. Nevertheless, eti-
ology is still needed for understanding how X and its struc-
ture could arise.
The above considerations suggest that replacing f by x 
(and F by X) in existing theories of function has two major 
consequences. First, it aligns these theories with specific 
aspects of the new theory. Second, the existing theories will 
then actually produce ontic-causal rather than epistemic-
real functions (Fig. 2d, h). This follows from the fact that 
X has autonomous causal efficacy, whereas f does not. One 
way to state the novelty of the present proposal is by noting 
that earlier accounts only consider the direct material reali-
zations of functions (e.g., how they work or how they have 
been formed by natural selection). In the new account, nat-
ural selection works, in addition, on the X process. The X 
process monitors, but it does not directly (i.e., immediately 
and proximately) participate in the working of functions. X 
only indirectly affects functions, by modulating how much 
they can vary (and thus how fast they can change, poten-
tially). The material realizations of functions do not require 
relations as causal factors (similarly to the fact that the 
weather does not require relations). In contrast, the ultimate 
causal efficacy of X does require relations (similarly to a 
weather simulation, which depends on relations with the 
actual weather if it is to be accurate and useful).
A taxonomy of existing theories of biological func-
tion is provided by Perlman (2004, 2009). The three main 
branches of that taxonomy are nonnaturalistic theories (Pla-
tonic and religious), quasi-naturalistic theories that depend 
on the notion of emergence, and naturalistic theories. The 
latter theories are subdivided into conventionalism and the-
ories that are primarily backward-looking, present-looking, 
or forward-looking. I will focus here on the latter three. 
Figure 3 illustrates that they can be viewed as representing 
different aspects of the new theory, by reformulating them 
within the new framework (by using X and x, rather than F 
and f).
The reformulation of the selected effects theory focuses 
on functions with goals related to the hereditary part of 
X. This part is formed by the evolutionary history of f in 
an agent’s lineage (leftmost arrow). That part of X can be 
regarded as backward-looking (in accordance with Perl-
man’s classification), because the structure of X implicitly 
refers to the evolutionary history. The reformulations of 
causal role theories (present-looking in Perlman’s classifi-
cation) specify how the factors of environment E and agent 
A contribute to X and its subgoals (Fig. 3, upward-pointing 
arrow). Formally, biological functions can then be regarded 
as capacities that are expected to realize the present sub-
goals of X. This realization involves mechanisms using fac-
tors in E and A, as sensed by the organism in the present 
(Fig. 1, right part).
Goal-contribution theories (e.g., Boorse 1976) depend 
on current goals of an agent. Perlman classifies them as 
backward-looking to the recent past. Such theories can 
also be reformulated within the new framework. The cur-
rent goals may then have been established recently in the 
hereditary part of X. Alternatively, they can belong to the 
behavioral part of X when they are acquired during the 
lifetime of an agent, such as through learning. The upper 
rightmost arrow, originating from both parts of X, symbol-
izes the rationale of these theories. Finally, forward-looking 
approaches (e.g., Bigelow and Pargetter 1987) focus on the 
overall goal of obtaining high f. When reformulated within 
the present framework, they focus instead on the overall 
goal of obtaining high x (which is in fact a true goal, in 
contrast to obtaining high f, which is only an “as if” goal).
Figure 3 shows that these previous theories can be posi-
tioned in the new theory, although always with an essen-
tial and obligatory switch from f to x. The new theory uni-
fies the earlier ones, and adds their explanatory power (see 
the next section). All causation in Figs.  1 and 3 involves 
well-understood forms of causation, either primarily deter-
ministic, primarily random, or combinations. The theory is 
therefore fully naturalistic. The required mechanisms are 
evolvable through standard natural selection (van Hateren 
2015a). Nevertheless, the special, nondeterministic G loop, 
as depicted in Fig.  1, produces a unique, emergent goal-
directedness. This arises from the unusual fact that a rela-
tion, namely the one between x and f, has acquired autono-
mous causal efficacy.
Intuitions About Functions
Based on an extensive literature review, Wouters (2005) 
compiled a list of 15 intuitions about functions with which 
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a theory of functions should ideally comply. He concluded 
that no existing theory could handle them all. Below they 
are discussed from the perspective of the new theory (all 
quotations are from Wouters 2005, pp. 133–134). The argu-
ments rely on the fact that X itself has evolved, and that it 
continues to change on evolutionary and behavioral time-
scales. It gives the organism an evolutionary advantage 
only if x is a reasonable approximation of f. Therefore, 
X will typically contain and acquire components that are 
useful for such an approximation, and lose those that have 
become useless or detrimental.
 1. “A theory of function should distinguish between 
activities that are functions (such as the beating of 
the heart) and activities that are side-effects of func-
tional organs (such as heart sounds and pulses).” Side-
effects are not included in the hereditary part of X (as 
they played no role in evolving X) and are therefore 
not automatically functional. However, when a side-
effect is incorporated into the behavioral part of X, 
through learning, it may become functional.
 2. “A theory of function should not allow one to ascribe 
functions to parts of systems that are not believed to 
have parts with functions (such as our solar system).” 
The solar system is not a living organism. It has nei-
ther f nor X, and therefore no parts with functions.
 3. “A theory of function should allow for maladapted 
functions.” The fur of a polar bear has as its primary 
function the reduction of heat loss. This function is 
determined by the hereditary part of the bear’s X (as 
heat loss is of such importance for fitness that X must 
have evolved to utilize it for making x an adequate 
estimate of f). However, when the bear lives in a zoo 
in the tropics, f deviates from x (and the correspond-
ing parts of F deviate from the corresponding parts of 
X). The fur is then maladaptive because it lowers f, 
but it is still a function for the bear because it remains 
incorporated in the bear’s X.
 4. “A theory of function should not depict the use other 
organisms make of the items of a certain organism as 
functions of those items. It is, for example, not a func-
tion of a dog’s long hair to harbor fleas.” For the dog, 
using its long hair for harboring fleas is not a func-
tion, because it is not incorporated in the dog’s X as 
a goal, i.e., as a factor that increases x. For the flea, 
living in the long hair of a dog is likely to be incorpo-
rated in the flea’s X as a goal.
 5. “A theory of function should distinguish between 
effects that are functions and effects that are acci-
dentally useful. Although belt buckles occasionally 
save their wearers’ life by deflecting bullets, it is not 
a function of belt buckles to deflect bullets.” Acciden-
tally useful effects just happen to contribute to f. But 
they are not incorporated in X (as they played no role 
in evolving X), and they are therefore not functions.
 6. “A theory of function should not depict the systematic 
use humans make of existing items for new purposes 
as functions of those items. It is, for example, not the 
function of the human nose to support eyeglasses.” 
It is not the default biological function of the nose, 
because it is not included in the hereditary part of X 
(as eyeglasses played no role in the evolution of X). 
Only when X is adjusted through learning, the nose 
may acquire an additional (though learned rather than 
biological) function for an agent.
 7. “A theory of function should allow one to attribute 
functions to traits that currently do not vary in the 
population.” The theory only requires that traits are 
expected to contribute positively to x and thereby 
probably to f. A positive contribution to fitness may 
not be observable in population variability. For exam-
ple, some functions may play such a fundamental role 
for cellular functioning that any genetic variation in 
them would be lethal. Such variations are nevertheless 
bound to happen (for molecular reasons), but would 
not produce viable cells. They would therefore not be 
observable as phenotypic variation in a population.
 8. “A theory of function should distinguish currently 
functional items from vestiges (like vestigial eyes in 
cave dwellers).” Vestigial eyes in cave dwellers are 
likely to have lost their representation in X, because 
if they were still included then that would lower the 
accuracy by which x approximates f. Thus, it would 
have been selected against in previous evolution. 
Without representation in X, such eyes have no func-
tion for cave dwellers.
 9. “A theory of function should allow one to attrib-
ute functions to the parts and behaviors of so-called 
‘instant organisms’, hypothetical organisms that have 
no evolutionary history.” Instant organisms are cre-
ated including their X. X is just a concurrent physi-
ological process. Those parts and behaviors that it 
monitors are functional. This is the same in an instant 
organism as in an identical organism with another his-
tory. Thus, the former has the same functions as the 
latter.
 10. “A theory of function should enable us to attrib-
ute functions to items that do not actually perform it 
(most sperm cells will never fertilize an egg cell and 
mating displays quite often do not have the intended 
effect).” Functions correspond to subgoals of X, 
which are, like X itself, to be understood in a proba-
bilistic sense. They are expected to contribute, on 
average, to x and therefore, probably, to f. Sperm cells 
are indeed likely to contribute to f, statistically. Most 
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do not, but the few ones that do are highly significant 
for fitness.
 11. “A theory of function should enable us to attrib-
ute functions to items such as malformed hearts that 
are incapable of performing their function.” A mal-
formed heart influences only f, not the inclusion of 
its functional goal in X (which was established when 
X evolved). Therefore, it retains its function, even 
when X and x indicate it is malfunctioning. The same 
applies to the case when epidemics and major disas-
ters reduce f in an entire population. Functions only 
depend on the form of X, and they are therefore not 
changed by epidemics.
 12. “A theory of function should allow one to attribute 
functions to the parts and behaviors of sterile organ-
isms such as mules.” Mules have a normal X and thus 
have the usual functions.
 13. “A theory of function should not allow one to attrib-
ute functions to organisms as a whole.” Organisms 
as a whole could only have a function if they are part 
of a larger system that has f and X. In that case, they 
would have a function for that larger system, not for 
themselves. One possible candidate for such a larger 
system is an ecological system. But such a system 
does not have a clear reproductive rate (required for 
f), and there are no indications that anything resem-
bling X and a G loop could be present in an ecologi-
cal system. A larger system that perhaps might have f 
and X is a colony of social insects (briefly discussed 
in van Hateren 2013). Animal husbandry is a clear 
case where organisms as a whole can indeed have a 
function, e.g., when keeping sheep for their wool is 
incorporated into the behavioral part of human X. But 
sheep are then merely functional for humans, not for 
themselves.
 14. “A theory of function should not allow one to attrib-
ute functions to such things as junk DNA, selfish 
DNA, and segregation distorter genes.” Junk DNA 
and other forms of DNA that do not contribute to f are 
unlikely to have their working monitored by subproc-
esses of X. If X would implicitly attribute x-enhanc-
ing effects to such forms of DNA, the approximation 
of f by x would be less accurate. Therefore, it would 
be selected against.
 15. “A theory of function should allow one to attribute 
functions to traits that are selected against.” Circum-
stances may have changed such that not having a spe-
cific evolved trait, or having another trait, produces 
higher f. The trait is then selected against. But it may 
still be relevant for producing an x that approximates 
f, and therefore still be monitored by X (and thus be 
functional). There will be growing selection pressure 
on X to stop monitoring a trait if the trait gradually 
disappears or becomes irrelevant for f.
It is clear that the new theory performs very well. All 
intuitions are aligned with the explanations of the the-
ory. Yet, the original theory (van Hateren 2015a) was not 
explicitly intended for explaining intuitions about bio-
logical functions. In that sense, the correspondence shown 
above is a successful prediction of the theory.
Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis in this article makes it plausible that biologi-
cal functions can indeed have an ontic-causal status. This 
requires a physiological process X within an agent that pro-
duces an approximation of the agent’s actual fitness, f. The 
intrinsic X participates in a causal loop that is evolvable 
and sustainable by conventional evolutionary mechanisms. 
The loop produces genuine agency and goal-directedness in 
living organisms, and makes the goal-directedness and nor-
mativity of functions ontic-causal as well. This ontic-causal 
status requires that functions in an agent be represented in 
X. Processes contributing to f without being monitored by 
X might be perceived by an observer as adaptations. They 
could be perceived as functional in the sense of objectively 
contributing to the agent’s fitness f. However, such func-
tionality would only be epistemic-real. It would only play a 
role for human scientific understanding. The agent itself is 
only directly connected to X, not to f and its history. There-
fore, only functions that are included in X are ontic-causal. 
Only those functions strictly exist as autonomous, goal-
directed parts of the causal dynamics of the agent.
Functions based on X combine the historical view 
of selected effects theories with the ahistorical view of 
causal role theories. The reason is that X forms, in effect, 
an implicit memory of previous evolutionary outcomes. In 
addition, it is adjustable in the present through learning and 
phenotypic plasticity. On the one hand, it is backward-look-
ing to the distant and recent past. On the other hand, it is 
present- and forward-looking, because fitness is associated 
with the current likelihood of surviving and reproducing.
The theory presented here is new and largely conjectural. 
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to think it is a plausi-
ble one. First, there are computational reasons; second, the-
oretical reasons; third, it can explain and unify a wide range 
of phenomena; and fourth, it is consistent with mounting 
evidence for the role of randomness in living organisms. 
Computationally, simple models show that the mechanism 
presented in Fig.  1 not only works, but also is evolvable 
for a range of conditions and models (van Hateren 2015a). 
The mechanism is advantageous, is quite simple in simple 
organisms, and requires only a slight variation on existing 
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mechanisms. It is therefore plausible that evolution has pro-
duced it, at or close to the origin of life (van Hateren 2013). 
The mechanism uses modulated randomness as an essen-
tial causal factor. The proposed system critically depends 
on and is evolvable through evolution by natural selection. 
This makes it understandable why such properties can only 
be observed in living systems.
As shown in the previous section, the theory is quite suc-
cessful in explaining intuitions about biological functions. 
Moreover, it largely matches with the concept of meaning 
in biological systems that has been developed in the field 
of biosemiotics (van Hateren 2015d). It explains why life 
seems to be characterized by having agency (van Hateren 
2013, 2015a). Other examples could be added. Many of 
these applications of the theory concern topics where alter-
native theories are absent, problematic, or only partially 
successful. A theory that can integrate wide, seemingly dis-
connected parts of reality in a well-defined way has intrin-
sic plausibility. Even if its components have not yet been 
shown explicitly, the fact that the theory has considerable 
explanatory power adds to the likelihood that such compo-
nents actually exist.
Finally, there is mounting empirical evidence for the 
importance of functional randomness in living systems 
(Faisal et al. 2008; Brembs 2011; Kiviet et al. 2014). Sev-
eral studies provide circumstantial evidence for the specific 
mechanism of Fig.  1. At the subcellular level, mutation 
rates are known to be modulated in proportion to cellu-
lar stress (Galhardo et  al. 2007), with stress presumably 
inversely related to cellular x. At the cellular level, the run-
and-tumble behavior of the bacterium E. coli (Macnab and 
Koshland 1972) provides an example of randomness modu-
lated by the availability of nutrients, also associated with 
fitness. At the neural level, a similar modulation of turn-
ing rates and randomness has been shown in the nematode 
worm C. elegans (Gray et  al. 2005; Gordus et  al. 2015). 
In the context of foraging behavior, switching from local 
search to a wider search area when the yield of food patches 
becomes low appears to follow a similar pattern in many 
species (Hills 2006). Neural plasticity as controlled by how 
dopamine depends on reward prediction errors (Glimcher 
2011) seems to conform as well. The dopaminergic system 
may thus contribute to X, at least partly.
However, all such examples may have alternative expla-
nations, and their precise role for fitness is not clear. Ulti-
mately, only targeted experiments with associated theo-
retical modeling can provide conclusive evidence for the 
theory. X is conjectured to integrate information about 
much of what is going on in an organism, and to produce 
effects throughout the organism. Therefore, a comprehen-
sive system-theoretic understanding of the entire organism 
is required. Quantitative evaluation is probably only practi-
cable, then, in very simple organisms. Nevertheless, there 
is no reason why empirical testing could not be performed, 
even if it would require considerable effort.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give 
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a 
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were 
made.
References
Bigelow J, Pargetter R (1987) Functions. J Philos 84:181–196
Boorse C (1976) Wright on functions. Philos Rev 85:70–86
Boorse C (1977) Health as a theoretical concept. Philos Sci 
44:542–573
Brembs B (2011) Towards a scientific concept of free will as a bio-
logical trait: spontaneous actions and decision-making in inver-
tebrates. Proc R Soc B 278:930–939
Buller DJ (1998) Etiological theories of function: a geographical sur-
vey. Biol Philos 13:505–527
Cummins R (1975) Functional analysis. J Philos 72:741–765
Cummins R (2002) Neo-teleology. In: Ariew A, Cummins R, Perlman 
M (eds) Functions: new essays in the philosophy of psychology 
and biology. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 164–174
Dennett DC (1991) Real patterns. J Philos 88:27–51
Faisal AA, Selen LPJ, Wolpert DM (2008) Noise in the nervous sys-
tem. Nat Rev Neurosci 9:292–303
Galhardo RS, Hastings PJ, Rosenberg SM (2007) Mutation as a stress 
response and the regulation of evolvability. Crit Rev Biochem 
Mol Biol 42:399–435
Garson J (2012) Function, selection, and construction in the brain. 
Synthese 189:451–481
Glimcher PW (2011) Understanding dopamine and reinforcement 
learning: the dopamine reward prediction error hypothesis. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA 108:15647–15654
Gordus A, Pokala N, Levy S et  al (2015) Feedback from network 
states generates variability in a probabilistic olfactory circuit. 
Cell 161:1–14
Gray JM, Hill JJ, Bargmann CI (2005) A circuit for navigation in Cae-
norhabditis elegans. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 102:3184–3191
Griffiths PE (1993) Functional analysis and proper functions. Br J 
Philos Sci 44:409–422
Hills TT (2006) Animal foraging and the evolution of goal-directed 
cognition. Cogn Sci 30:3–41
Kiviet DJ, Nghe P, Walker N et al (2014) Stochasticity of metabolism 
and growth at the single-cell level. Nature 514:376–379
Macnab RM, Koshland DE Jr (1972) The gradient-sensing mech-
anism in bacterial chemotaxis. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 
69:2509–2512
McLaughlin P (2001) What functions explain: functional explana-
tion and self-reproducing systems. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge
Millikan RG (1984) Language, thought, and other biological catego-
ries. Bradford/The MIT Press, Cambridge
Millikan RG (1989) In defense of proper functions. Philos Sci 
56:288–302
Moreno A, Mossio M (2015) Biological autonomy: a philosophical 
and theoretical enquiry. Springer, Dordrecht
Mossio M, Saborido C, Moreno A (2009) An organizational account 
of biological functions. Br J Philos Sci 60:813–841
Nanay B (2010) A modal theory of function. J Philos 107:412–431
126 J. H. van Hateren 
1 3
Neander K (1991) The teleological notion of ‘function.’ Aust J Philos 
69:454–468
Neander K (1996) Swampman meets swampcow. Mind Lang 
11:118–129
Perlman M (2004) The modern philosophical resurrection of teleol-
ogy. Monist 87:3–51
Perlman M (2009) Changing the mission of theories of teleology: 
DOs and DON’Ts for thinking about function. In: Krohs U, 
Kroes P (eds) Functions in biological and artificial worlds. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, pp 17–36
van Hateren JH (2013) A new criterion for demarcating life from non-
life. Orig Life Evol Biosph 43:491–500
van Hateren JH (2015a) Active causation and the origin of meaning. 
Biol Cybern 109:33–46
van Hateren JH (2015b) Intrinsic estimates of fitness affect the causal 
structure of evolutionary change. Biol Philos 30:729–746
van Hateren JH (2015c) Causal non-locality can arise from con-
strained replication. EPL-Europhys Lett 112:20004
van Hateren JH (2015d) The natural emergence of (bio)semiosic phe-
nomena. Biosemiotics 8:403–419
Walsh DM (2015) Organisms, agency, and evolution. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge
Walsh DM, Ariew A (1996) A taxonomy of functions. Can J Philos 
26:493–514
Wouters A (2005) The functional debate in philosophy. Acta Biotheor 
53:123–151
Wright L (1973) Functions. Philos Rev 82:139–168
